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JOINT SAVINGS BANK ACCOUNTS IN MARYLAND
By ALVIN KATZENSTEIIN*
Joint bank accounts involve complex legal and practical
problems. An officer of one of the larger savings banks in
Baltimore estimated to the present writer that approxi-
mately two-thirds of the savings accounts in his institution
were established in some type of joint deposit form. This
is no doubt typical of the situation in all banks. Naturally,
many legal problems can arise in connection with a special
device so frequently utilized. The most typical form is the
joint deposit in trust, which is now generally used.
The desire to achieve various results by one decisive
stroke has led to the popularity of these accounts. Two
aims, in particular, seem to have been dominant in the mind
of the layman. The desires to keep independent individual
control during life and to provide a right of survivorship
to a certain person after death2 are, in the main, the most
frequent objectives.
The first attempts to gain these results were made by
trying to create a gift through the wording of the account.
Though appropriate wording would achieve the desired con-
trol during life, the gift was held to be ineffective to create
survivorship after death.' The form of a tenancy by the
entirety produced just the opposite result." It achieved
survivorship, but did not allow complete individual control
during life. The trust form of a joint bank account was
found to be the only method to obtain the desired results of
control during life and right of survivorship in the desired
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; LL.B. 1938, University of Maryland School
of Law.
"This article deals only with problems arising out of savings bank ac-
counts and does not purport to deal with any other type of bank account.
2 This is to avoid the delay and expense in the distribution of estates
that are involved in Orphans' Court procedure.
:Infra circa notes 23-31.
Infra circa notes 61-70.
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party after death.5 The use of such form, however, has had
certain interesting effects upon the rights of creditors, set-
off, and taxation of the individual interests in such accounts.
There may be other effects not yet litigated.
It is the purpose of this article to trace the development
of the law that has reached the above results, and to treat
the collateral problems that have arisen. The cases seem
naturally to divide into those dealing with: (1) gifts of bank
accounts; (2) the tenancy by the entirety in bank accounts;
(3) the use of the trust device to accomplish what the other
devices failed to achieve; and (4) collateral problems of
rights of creditors, set-off, liability of the bank, and taxa-
tion.
Gnats
The first attempts to create rights in a savings bank ac-
count in some one other than the original owner of the
money were made in the form of a gift, through the wording
of the account. Efforts were also made to transfer a sav-
ings account by delivering the bank book, but these attempts
were always subject to the law governing gifts of a chose in
action because the actual money itself was never manually
transferred. Hence, an understanding of the development
of the law of gifts of choses is essential as a necessary pre-
liminary to an analysis of the bank account cases.
A recent and excellent article6 by Professor Paul Bruton
has developed that topic along the following general lines.
Originally choses in action were not transferable at all,
either gratuitously or for a consideration. The doctrine of
delivery was first worked out with reference to the transfer
of tangible chattels. It was firmly established before choses
in action became assignable7 that an irrevocable gift of
personal property could be made only by written assignment
'Infra circa notes 71-83.
Bruton, The Requirement of Delivery a8 Applied to Gift8 of Choses in
Action (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 837. This article is closely followed not only
because of Its excellence but because of its recent citation and approval
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland In Brooks v. Mitchell, infra note 46.
SThe earliest case holding that a chose in action may be assigned by
delivery of a written instrument is Jones v. Selby, Prec. Ch. 300 (1710),
where it was held that Exchequer Tallies were proper subjects of a gift
caisa nzortis.
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properly executed and delivered, or by delivery of the res,
with intention to make a gift.8
Commercial needs and the difficulty of regulating trans-
fers of property on a possessory basis, however, soon gave
rise to the transferability of choses in action. A tendency
arose to accept other evidence, equally indicative of the in-
tent to give, in lieu of actual transfer of possession. This
tendency to qualify the requirement of actual delivery of
possession first appeared in the theory of constructive deliv-
ery. The delivery of a key to a chest would substitute for
the actual delivery of the property in the chest,9 for this was
a transfer of the means of acquiring possession of the
property given.
In 1744, Lord Hardwicke, in Snelgrove v. Bailey,"0 gave
the first discussion of the doctrine of delivery as applied to
choses in action. That case involved a gift causa mortis of
a bond delivered to the defendant. The gift was upheld by
the Chancellor who said:"' "You cannot sue at law without
a bond; for though you may give evidence of a deed at law
that is lost, yet you cannot of a bond, because you must make
profert of it".
Having held that a good gift causa mortis could be made
of a bond by delivery, the court was soon presented with a
similar problem. Eight years later in Ward v. Turner2
the question arose, before the same Chancellor, as to whether
a delivery of receipts for certain South Sea annuities (the
annuities themselves being owned by the donor but being
in the custody of a third party) would constitute a valid gift
causa mortis of the annuities. Essentially the question pre-
sented was how far the new laws permitting assignments
of choses in action would qualify the old rules of delivery.
The Court held the gift incomplete. In speaking of Snel-
grove v. Bailey, Lord Hardwicke l said:
"It was argued, that there was no want of actual
delivery there or possession, the bond being but a chose
The two leading English cases standing for this proposition are Irons
v. Smallpiece, 2 B. and Aid. 551 (1819), and Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q. B.
D. 57 (1890).
9 Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270 (1738).
103 Atk. 214 (1744).
1- 3 Atk. 214, 215.12 2 Ves. Sen. 431 (1752).
18 2 Ves. Sen. 431, 442.
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in action; and therefore there was no delivery but of
the paper. If I went too far in that case, it is not a
reason I should go farther: and I chuse to stop there.
But I am of opinion that decree was right, and differs
from this case; for though it is true, that a bond, which
is specialty, is a chose in action, and its principal value
consists in the thing in action, yet some property is
conveyed by the delivery; for the property is vested;
and to this degree . . . the person to whom this spe-
cialty is given, may cancel, burn, and destroy it; the
consequence of which is, that it puts it in his power to
destroy the obligee's power of bringing an action, be-
cause no one can bring an action on a bond without a
profert in Cur."
The Chancellor then continued to discuss constructive
delivery and pointed out that the delivery of a key to bulky
goods had been held to be a delivery of the possession, be-
cause it was the way of coming at the possession, or to make
use of the thing, and therefore the key is not a symbol which
would not do.
Concerning this, Mr. Bruton pointed out :"
"The reasoning of the case can be fully understood
only by considering it in the light of the law as it then
existed. By the rule of profert, mentioned in the deci-
sion, it was required, when suit was brought upon a
sealed instrument, that the instrument itself should be
presented in court as part of the pleadings. 5 Profert
was not excused if the instrument were lost or could
not be procured, for the equitable doctrine permitting
the proof of lost documents had not yet been fully rec-
ognized by the law courts. Under these rules of law
it was not difficult to draw the analogy between the de-
livery of the bond and the delivery of the key. The
former transferred control or dominion over the thing
given quite as effectively as the latter. Transfer of the
bond absolutely deprived the donor of the legal means
of enforcing the chose represented by it."
As further suggested by Mr. Bruton :16
"Ward v. Turner formulated the doctrine which was
the starting point for the law of delivery in gifts of
1, Bruton, op. cit. supra, n. 6, 842.
15 The rule of profert and its development into the so-called best evi-
dence rule is discussed in 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd. Ed. 1923) See. 1177.
16 Op. cit. supra n. 6, 842.
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choses in action. The case stands for two propositions
which have been of tremendous importance in the de-
velopment of the law. (1) It held that delivery, in the
sense of transfer of control, was as necessary in gifts of
choses in action as it was in gifts of tangible property.
Proof of donative intent alone was as ineffectual in one
type of case as in the other. (2) Since the delivery re-
quired was transfer of control, the case determined the
kind of a delivery which would satisfy this test as ap-
plied to a chose in action. Only the transfer of a docu-
ment which would deprive the donor of the means of
enforcing the chose would satisfy the test."' 7
Shortly after this decision its whole basis was swept
away when the rule of profert was supplanted by the "best
evidence rule". The latter is a rule by which all writings
are the best evidence of their own contents and they must
be introduced to prove matters covered by their provisions
unless they have been lost or destroyed, or their absence is
otherwise satisfactorily accounted for. The effect of this,
in Mr. Bruton's estimation, was to make "the requirement
of delivery in gifts of choses in action mean nothing more
than the transfer of an instrument which is the complete and
best evidence of the obligation assigned and is required to
be presented or surrendered to the obligor as a condition
to the obligor's duty to perform." 8
Thus, the basis of the law of gifts of choses in action was
established to the extent it bears relation to our discussion.
The early treatment of the topic by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland 9 ante-dated of course, the views of Mr. Bruton.
Ward v. Turner was construed to have decided that a deliv-
ery of the thing intended to be given is essential to the per-
fection of the gift"0 and the tendency of the Court was seem-
17 It is to be noted that the delivery of the bond in Snelgrove v. Bailey
deprived the donor of the means of enforcing the chose, while the delivery
of the receipts in Ward v. Turner did not. The two eases may thus be
distinguished by the common law rule of profert.
1" This reasoning is said to be in error by Williston, Gifts of Rights Un-
der Contracts in. Writing by Delivery of the Writing (1930) 40 Yale L. J.
5. However, the distinction between Ward v. Turner and Bailey v. Snel-
grove, pointed out by Bruton, supra n. 6, seems to this author to be the
more logical and is supported by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Brooks
v. Mitchell, 163 Md. 1, 161 AtI. 261 (1932). treated infra circa notes 46-60.
29 Pennington v. Gittings, 2 G. and J1. 208 (1830); Bradley v. Hunt, 5
G. and J. 58 (1832).
20 Ibid.
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ingly to accept that as the settled rule, and to restrict Swel-
grove v. Bailey to its actual facts. This seemed the trend
even though they were mutually dependent upon the same
background for their existence.
In the following discussion of gifts, the two problems of
(1) a gift through the wording of the account and (2) a gift
through the physical donation of the bank book will be con-
sidered together for purposes of clarity.
The first case involving a gift of money deposited in a
bank was Gardner v. Merritt.1 The grandmother of com-
plainants deposited during her life various sums of money
in the Savings Bank of Baltimore to the credit of complain-
ants, having caused accounts to be opened in the bank in the
name of each of them, as a minor, and containing immedi-
ately after the name of the infant, the words, "subject to the
order of Susanna A Merritt". The Court of Appeals, in
deciding that the money belonged to the infants, said the
entry in the book was to be interpreted with reference to the
language of the by-law of the bank." The Court then pro-
ceeded to link that by-law with the wording in the pass book
and the two were interpreted by a thorough inquiry into the
facts of the case. The facts showed that the delivery of the
deposits to the bank was a perfected gift to the infants.
The control retained by the donor was for their benefit and
not such control as would leave the donor a locus poeni-
tentiae and thus invalidate the gift. Though this case was
not faced with the same objections that were deemed fatal
to Ward v. Turner, still the court was liberal in finding a
delivery to the infants despite the control retained by the
donor.
However, the Court did not long adhere to the method of
construing words in a pass book, as adopted by the previous
case. Four years later, in Murray v. Cannonl3 the Court
refused to uphold a purported gift of a savings bank de-
posit. A deposit with the Savings Bank of Baltimore read
"James Cannon, subject to his order, or the order of his
2132 Md. 78 (1870).
2' The by-law read: "Guardians and parents may deposit for the bene-
fit of their wards and children and subject the deposits to the control of
the guardians or parents."
2341 Md. 466 (1874).
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daughter, Mary E. Cannon". Upon the death of James,
Mary claimed that her father, in his lifetime, had given her
the book of deposit with the money credited therein, to be
held by her in trust for herself, and her brothers and sisters.
The administratrix claimed the money in the bank as belong-
ing to the estate of James Cannon. That claim was upheld.
The Court reviewed the general law of gifts by reiterat-
ing:24
"To perfect a gift, the delivery of the thing in-
tended to be given is indispensable. There must be a
parting by the donor with the legal power and dominion
over it. If he retains the dominion, if there remains to
him a locus poenitentiae, there cannot be a perfect and
legal donation."
The language of the Court seemingly outlawed the theory
of a constructive gift. Mention was made of the fact that
Mary Cannon was acting as the agent of her father, and
that the agency was revoked by his death.25  However, the
Court said" that the question was settled by Gardner v.
Merritt and that:
"It cannot be insisted after the decision in that case,
that James Cannon had parted with legal dominion and
control over money standing in his name in the bank,
because it was there subject to his order or the order
of Mary E. Cannon. On the contrary, it was his as
absolutely as it would have been hers, if the deposit had
been made in her name, subject to the order of James
Cannon and had so continued in the bank up to the time
of his death. ""
The question also arose as to whether the delivery of the
pass book to Mary Cannon could be said to operate as a
"41 Md. 466, 476.
"Carey v. Dennis, 13 Md. 18 (1859).
41 Md. 466, 477.
"This Interpretation of Gardner v. Merritt, as authority for allowing
the words in the deposit book to control, seems erroneous. That case
was authority for just the opposite conclusion because very little stress
was placed upon the wording of the account but much importance was
given to the actual situation. The Court there said, "In every case the
general purpose and intention of the donor, and not the u8e of one par-
ticular term or another will decide the question of whether a party does
or does not take in a fiduciary capacity." However, without a complete
inquiry into the factual situations, Murray v. Cannon stated that James
Cannon had not parted with legal dominion and control over the money
because of the wording of the account. Cf. Gorman v. Gorman, 87 Md.
338, 39 A. 1038 (1898) infra n. 31.
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delivery to her of the money in question, and it was decided
that it could not. This branch of the case was held to be
within the decision of Ward v. Turner. The Court reiter-
ated the facts of that case and stated its holding to be that
"the delivery of the receipts was not a delivery of the annui-
ties, as they could only be delivered by a transfer or some-
thing equivalent. So, in this case the delivery of the book
of deposit did not constitute a delivery of the money which
it is claimed was the thing intended to be given, because its
delivery could not be affected in that way". No discussion,
reasoning, or reference to the intention of the parties was
made. There was merely the reiteration of the oft-re-
peated, well-worn dogma, "the delivery of the thing in-
tended to be given is indispensable to perfect a gift".
Murray v. Cannon, then, is authority for two points: (1)
the donor does not part with dominion and control over
an account standing in his own name in a bank and subject
to his own order, by making it also subject to the order of
another, and (2) the delivery of a savings bank book of de-
posit does not constitute a delivery of the money.
In Taylor v. Henry,29 the form of deposit was somewhat
different from that used in Murray v. Cannon. The pass
book read, "Joseph Henry, Margaret Taylor, and the sur-
vivor of them, subject to the order of either". The evidence
showed that Joseph Henry deposited his own money in the
bank in that form at a time when he was in feeble health and
contemplating a sea voyage. After his death Margaret ob-
tained the bank book and drew out the entire balance. The
administrators of Joseph Henry then filed a bill for an ac-
counting. Margaret Taylor claimed the deposit vested in
her by survivorship according to the terms and effect of the
deposit. The Court discussed the requisites of a gift and
reached the conclusion that Margaret Taylor was simply
constituted an agent with power to draw money from the
bank to meet some supposed or apprehended emergency
that might possibly arise.
Taylor v. Henry clearly lays down the rule that where a
deposit is made by one person in the name of two persons
28 41 Md. 466, 477.2948 Md. 550 (1878).
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(one of whom is the original owner) subject to the order of
either, there is no gift of the funds by the original depositor
to his joint owner. To quote the Court :30
"To make such a gift complete there must be an
actual transfer of all right and dominion over the thing
given by the donor plus an acceptance by the donee or
some competent person for him; and it is essential to
the validity of such gift that it should transfer the prop-
erty at once and completely. Until the gift is then
made perfect, a locus poenitentiae remains".
In such a deposit the donor always retains the power to
draw out the money because the account is subject to his
order. He does not, therefore, divest himself of dominion
and control over the fund, and the gift is invalid. The
terms of the entry themselves do not import an actual pres-
ent donation by the donor to the donee, so the words, "to the
survivor of them" are impotent.
The only means of reconciling this case with Gardner v.
Merritt is to realize that the latter case deals with a deposit
for the benefit of a minor under the by-laws of the bank, and
must be regarded as the exception to the rules laid down
by Murray v. Cannon and Taylor v. Henry. These two
cases decided that as long as the money originally belonged
to the donor, and it continued to be subject to his right of
withdrawal, there could be no gift and no right of survivor-
ship in the donee through the mere wording of the account.
This became the basis of many later Maryland cases with
similar or slightly different facts.31
30 48 Md. 550, 557.
1 a. Conser v. Snowden, 54 Md. 175 (1880), decided that a gift of
an order on a bank for money on deposit in a savings account was not
a good gift of the money where the donee did not have the bank book
and the donor died before he got it.
b. Second National Bank of Baltimore v. Wrightson, 63 Md. 81
(1885). A deposit in the name of the husband, payable to the hus-
band or wife did not authorize payment of the money to the wife
after the death of the husband. However, it is to be noted that the
above point was not argued. It was conceded. The main point
argued dealt with the reformation of the certificate of deposit.
c. Dougherty and Reilly v. Moore, et al., 71 Md. 248, 18 A. 35
(1889). A deposit in the name of husband and wife and the survivor,
subject to the order of either, was held not to be a gift even though
later an entry was made by which the husband gave the money in
the account to his wife. However, after the entry the husband con-
tinued to draw money out of the account. "There can be no gift as
1939]
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The effect of the delivery of a bank book on the owner-
ship of the fund it represents was next dealt with by way of
dictum in Whalen v. Milholland.2 It was purely dictum
because the Court found that the testimony failed to show a
delivery of the book, but nevertheless the treatment the
question received is of interest because of the general im-
long as the donor retains the control and dominion over the sub-
ject of the gift." 71 Md. 248, 252. Another deposit in the name of
the husband, subject also to the order of himself or his wife with
the same additional entry was also held not to be a valid gift.
d. Baker v. Hedrick, 85 Md. 645, 37 A. 363 (1897). The account
read "Henry Hedrick and his wife, Anna Hedrick, subject to the order
of either or the survivor." The husband died and it was found that
the money originally belonged to the wife. Therefore there was no
valid gift and the estate of the husband was not entitled to the
money.
e. Gorman v. Gorman, 87 Md. 338, 39 A. 1038 (1898). A savings
account in the name of Theresa McConnell was later changed to a
joint account in the name of Theresa McConnell and her niece, "joint
owners, payable to the order of either or the survivor." The pass
book was always retained by Theresa McConnell until her death,
when both the niece and Theresa McConnell's executor claimed the
fund. Upon a bill of interpleader being filed by the bank it was held
that the money belonged to the executor and not to the niece. Much
stress was placed both upon the intention of the parties and the
facts of the case, and there was little or no reliance upon the word-
ing of the account to determine ownership. Thus, in that respect,
the Court has gotten away from Murray v. Cannon. It was con-
tended that the words "joint owners" made the fund the joint prop-
erty of the two persons. But the Court said, 87 Md. 338, 349, 350
"we cannot close our eyes to all the other evidence in this case and
give effect alone to two words in the entry."
f. Savings Bank of Baltimore v. McCarthy, 89 Md. 194, 42 A.
929 (1899) Plaintiff made deposits in a savings bank in the names of
her nieces, then infants, subject to her order. She was not then
guardian and did not intend to give them the money. Held: No gift,
and depositor was entitled to draw out the money.
g. Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199, 43 A. 45 (1899). Elizabeth
O'Neill had a savings account in her own name which was closed and
another opened in the name of "Elizabeth O'Neill and Mary Whalen.
Joint owners. Payable to the order of either or the survivor." Upon
the death of Elizabeth O'Neill it was decided that the account passed
to her executor and not to the joint owner. There was no valid gift.
The words "joint owners" do not restrain the depositor from with-
drawing the money and therefore there was a Zocu8 poenitentiae and
no valid gift.
h. Colmary v. Fanning, 124 Md. 548, 92 A. 1045 (1915). A sav-
ings deposit in the name of "Sadie Colmary, also subject to the order
of A. H. Colmary, either or the survivor" did not constitute a gift
to A. H. Colmary of the money deposited in the bank by Sadie Col-
mary. Here the Court indicated the way. in which one member of a
joint bank account may be the donee of the fund by saying, 124 Md.
548, 565, that "the entry did not, without a surrender of the bank
book to him for the purpose of enabling him to withdraw the money
for his own use, amount to a gift by her of the money deposited In
that account to him."
02 89 Md. 199, 43 A. 45 (1899) sapra n. 31,
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portance of the case itself. The following conclusions were
reached: (1) that where the terms of the deposit did not
purport to create an interest as donee in the claimant, the
delivery of the book did not transfer the ownership of the
money on deposit;8 (2) that mere possession of the book,
worded "A and B joint owners. Payable to the order of
either or the survivor", whilst a fact to be weighed in de-
ciding the question as to who owns the fund, was not con-
clusive evidence of ownership.8" On the basis of this, the
Court went on to say:
"Where it appears that the original owner pur-
posely deposited the funds to his and another's credit
as joint owners, retaining the pass book so as to con-
tinue his dominion over the money; a distinct unequivo-
cal delivery of the book to the other person named as
co-owner, with the intention to part with the owner-
ship and make an irrevocable gift of the fund and an
acceptance of it by the donee, would pass the whole
interest therein to the donee, because there would then
be no inconsistency between the legal effect of the entry
on the book, and the right in which the donee of the
book could claim the deposit, and there would no longer
be a locus poenitentiae in the original owner".
The conclusion of the dictum was correct, but the method
that the Court used to reach its end was but a begging of
the question. The wording of the account was made de-
terminative of the question of whether the delivery of the
bank book represented a gift of the funds in the bank. But,
if the Court had been willing to recognize the doctrine of
symbolic delivery, as later carried forward by Mr. Bruton,"6
33 Based on Murray v. Cannon, 41 Md. 466 (1874) supra circa n. 23.
It seems that the basis of distinction existed in the fact that in Whalen
v. Milholland the wording of the account specifically made the two persons
whose names appeared on the pass book "Joint owners", while in Mur-
ray v. Cannon they were not so named; therefore the terms of the deposit
did not purport to create an interest as donee in the claimant because of
the lack of the words, "joint owners" in the latter case.
., Based on Gorman v. Gorman, 87 Md. 338, 39 A. 1038 (1898), supra n.
31. Because of the necessity of proving not only delivery but also in-
tention, this statement may be explained as merely reiterating the fact
that in order to sustain a valid gift an intention to make the gift must
be proved and mere delivery of the subject of the gift without requisite
intention Is not sufficient.
"89 Md. 199, 206.
"See supra circa n. 18. This doctrine was later recognized in Mary-
land In Brooks v. Mitchell, infra n. 46.
19391
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so as to allow delivery of the "best evidence" to be suf-
ficient delivery for a gift, there no longer would have been
a locus poenitentiae in the owner even if he gave his bank
book away to one who was not a joint owner. Thus the
wording on the account need not have been the determining
factor.
Both the first and second propositions of Whalen v. Mil-
holland represented the efforts of this and previous courts
to reconcile Murray v. Cannon with the weight of authority
in this country. 7 In doing so they failed to take cognizance
of the fact that there were two questions in Murray v. Can-
non. First, did the wording of the account create an inter-
est in the donee; and second, did a delivery of the book
effectually deliver the funds in the bank? As to the sec-
ond question, the answer was "no", predicated not upon
any wording of the account book, as is suggested by the
Milholland case, but solely upon the misinterpretation of
Ward v. Turner. The effect of this was seemingly to hold
that a symbolical delivery was not valid; and that in order
to have a gift of a chose in action, the thing desired to be
given must itself be transferred. This rule was to be ex-
plained away in a later Maryland decision as resting on
the common law need for "profert";38 but the Court was
not yet ready in Whalen v. Milholland to take the jump,
when it could support itself by the nature of the account
involved.
At this early date, it was not yet taken into consider-
ation that a Savings Bank book has a peculiar character
in that it is the only security the depositor has as evidence
of his debt. The book is ordinarily the only instrument
by which the money can be obtained and its possession is
thus some evidence of title in the person presenting it to
the bank. 9 Therefore, as the main questions involved in
the validity of a gift are the intention of the donor and
whether or not he has a locus poenitentiae, presupposing
""The great weight of authority supports the proposition that a gift
of Savings Bank deposits by delivery of the pass book is a valid and
complete gift of the money." 'Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199, 207, 43
A. 45 (1899).
a See discussion of Brooks v. Mitchell, infra circa notes 46-60.
Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Aid. 199, 43 A. 45 (1899).
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an adequate delivery, it would seem to be more logical to
say that for these very reasons a gift of a Savings Bank
deposit book with the appropriate intention, is a gift of
the funds it represents, than to base the validity of the
gift on the type of wording used in the account. When a
depositor gives away his savings bank book with the inten-
tion of divesting himself of control and dominion over the
fund in the bank, he is giving away the sole tangible evi-
dence he has of his interest in the account. It is but a
recognition of this to say that he has no locus poenitentiae
when the book has been given away with the intention of
making a gift of the account.
The next case in which the question whether the gift of
a Savings Bank Deposit book was a gift of the funds it rep-
resented was Jones v. Crisp.40 The account was opened by
Frederica Crisp on August 15, 1904 in the name of "Fred-
erica Crisp in case of death subject to the order of Evan
Jones." In October, 1904, four months before the death
of Frederica Crisp, she gave the pass book to Evan Jones.
At her death the bank filed a bill of interpleader and the
court directed that the fund be paid to the administrators
of the estate of Frederica Crisp, as the property of the de-
ceased intestate.
The court rightly decided, in line with the earlier Mary-
land cases, that the entry itself did not create any interest
in the account in the intended donee, Evan Jones. 1 By the
terms of the entry itself, the donor retained absolute con-
trol and dominion over the fund during her lifetime. Thus
a locus poenitentiae remained and the gift was not made
perfect.
However, the Court went on to say that under the facts
and circumstances of this case the delivery of the book
of deposit by the alleged donor, and the possession of it by
the donee at the time of the death of the donor, did not
operate to make a valid and complete gift inter vivos of
the fund in question. To support this proposition the court
blandly cited Murray v. Cannon and Whalen v. Milholland,
40109 Md. 30, 71 A. 515 (1908).
41 Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550 (1878), supra circa notes 29-31.
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and said:4 "the delivery of the book of deposit in this
case, with the entry therein, 'in case of death subject to the
order of the donee,' did not constitute a delivery of the
money, because the delivery of the fund was limited 'in
case of death' of the donor. The possession of the book,
was entirely consistent with the form of the entry in the
book, because the donee could not withdraw the money."
The Court concluded:" "it is very clear, we think, that
she did not intend to part with the possession and dominion
over the property." This author is unable to perceive the
clarity of the donor's intent from the court's statements.
What the Court failed to consider was that the reason they
held the donee could not withdraw the money was their
failure to recognize the validity of the gift under the rule
of symbolic delivery later sustained in Brooks v. Mitchell."'
The Court seems to have adopted the dictum in Whalen
v. Milholland and applied it to the present facts. The prob-
lem of whether a gift of a Savings Bank deposit book was
a gift of the fund represented by the book was answered
by looking at the entry in the pass book and deciding that
the form of the entry was entirely consistent with the
donee's possession of the book because the donee could not
withdraw the money and therefore there was no valid gift.
It is submitted that the consistency of the entry with the
possession is only a slight indication of the intention of the
donor in allowing the possession to get to someone other
than himself, and that therefore such conclusive stress
should not be placed on the wording of the account in hold-
ing valid or invalid a proposed gift.
The Court again failed to differentiate between two es-
sentially different problems. To repeat, these are, first,
did the wording of the pass book effectuate the gift; and
second, did the delivery of the book effectuate the gift?
The latter question should be answered in the affirmative
if there were an intention to give away the fund even though
the wording of the account was insufficient for that purpose.
The intention of the donor cannot properly be found by
2109 Md. 30, 35.
43 Ibid.
" See discussion 8upra circa n. 39 and infra circa n. 46-60.
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looking at the wording of the pass book entered at a time
prior to the date at which the intention is significant. The
intention should be found as of the date on which the book
is delivered.
Five years later, the Court took a step forward when
it clearly recognized the right of a sole owner of a bank
account to give it away. In Frentz v. Schwarze" the donor
gave the bank book to the donee, signed a declaration in
writing of her desire to vest the ownership of the account
in the donee, and executed an order on the bank for the
payment of the fund to the donee. The Court entered into
very little discussion of the law of gifts but merely upheld
the donation by saying, "Every method available to the
donor under the circumstances for divesting her own in-
terest in the fund and consummating the gift was in fact
employed. "
In the latest case on the question, Brooks v. Mitchell,46
the Court completed its tedious trek toward acceptance of
the modern doctrine of symbolic delivery as being applic-
able to delivery of a savings bank book. The facts were
that Alton Brooks had $5,600 in a savings account in the
Baltimore Trust Company. After his death a black satchel
containing a pass book for the deposit was found in the
Mitchell home where Alton Brooks lived prior to his death.
Testimony revealed that on the night before he went to the
hospital, he had in his room a black and brown suitcase.
Pointing to the black one, he said to Mrs. Mitchell, "Judith,
I am giving you the black suitcase and that suitcase con-
tains a life insurance policy. If I die, take that and bury
me. Everything else you find in that suitcase is yours".
She then took the suitcase and put it in her bedroom. This
was done in the presence of Alton Brooks. Upon the death
of the latter, Mrs. Mitchell filed a bill of complaint in which
she prayed that the deposit be declared to be her sole prop-
erty. She claimed a gift causa mortis of the bank book
and the fund it represented. The gift was upheld and judg-
ment was rendered for Mrs. Mitchell.
+'122 Md. 12, 89 A. 439 (1913).
40163 Md. 1, 161 A. 261 (1932).
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Here the question was squarely presented whether the
sole owner of a savings bank account could effectually give
away that account through the gift of the savings bank
deposit book. The Court first discussed the problem of
delivery and reached the conclusion that the delivery of the
bank book was more than merely symbolic and said :' "his
(referring to Alton Brook's) language and conduct at the
time Mrs. Mitchell took possession of the suitcase, when
considered in connection with his declarations both before
and after that event, indicating an intent consistent there-
with, were sufficient proof of delivery". Therefore assum-
ing that there was a sufficient delivery of the bank book,
the remaining question is whether that was a delivery of the
fund of which the book was evidence.
With this question in mind the Court turned to Murray
v. Cannon and said that upon the authority of Ward v.
Turner and upon its facts it had held that the delivery of
the book of deposit was not a delivery of the money. 8
But they said :"
"The case is unsatisfactory as a precedent for sev-
eral reasons; first, because the condition upon which
the reasoning in Ward v. Turner was based no longer
exists ;50 second, because the mere delivery of the bank
book to Mary E. Cannon was not in itself evidence of a
donative intent because the circumstances under which
she came into possession of the book are not referred
to in the opinion."
Approving of the line of reasoning adopted by Profes-
sor Bruton5' the court concluded that :2
"The vital and important thing decided by Ward v.
Turner was that there could be no valid delivery of a
4' 163 Md. 1, 17.
" It is well to notice here that the Court now approacnes Murray v.
Cannon by a different method than that used in the Whalen v. Milholland
dictum, where the former case was sought to be reconciled on the basis of
the wording of the account.
40 163 Md. 1, 14.
50 Apparently, the court referred to the abolition of the rule of "profert"
and the development of the best evidence rule as discussed in Bruton,
supra circa n. 13. The rule of profert was no doubt the distinction between
Ward v. Turner and Snelgrove v. Bailey, supra circa notes 10, 11, 12.
" Ibid.
52 163 Md. 1, 14, 15.
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gift mortis causa unless there was an actual tradition
of it, or of some token or evidence thereof, the loss of
which completely deprived the donor of any control
over it, as in Bailey v. Snelgrove where the delivery
of the bond made it impossible for the donor to enforce
his rights under it so long as it remained in the pos-
session of the donee."
It was recognized that the only case directly in point
in this state (Murray v. Cannon) points the other way but
that no reason was assigned for that conclusion other than
the decision in Ward v. Turner. However, the Court de-
cided that Ward v. Turner with Bailey v. Snelgrove did not
support, but was opposed to, the conclusion in Murray v.
Cannon, for it was held in the former cases that the actual
tradition of some token or evidence of a gift, the loss of
which would deprive the donor of any control over the gift,
was a sufficient delivery. And the loss of a savings bank
passbook would deprive the donor of any control over the
deposit evidenced by it quite as effectually as the loss of
the bond in Bailey v. Snelgrove deprived the donor in that
case of control over his rights by the obligor. Therefore
the court that decided Murray v. Cannon was wrong in
basing its decision so squarely on Ward v. Turner without
inquiring into the reasons behind the holding."
The conclusion was finally reached that :" "It is appar-
ent from an examination of the cases that the uniform
policy of this Court, in applying the doctrine of construc-
tive delivery to gifts, whether mortis causa or inter vivos,
has been to adhere to the rule as stated in Bailey v. Snel-
grove and Ward v. Turner rather than to the construction
placed upon those cases in Murray v. Cannon."
In summarizing the Maryland cases that have dealt
with gifts of savings bank accounts, we see that two major
problems have been presented: first, the effect of the word-
ing of the account; and second, the effect of the donation of
the pass book or certificate to another without the produc-
53 The Court failed to discuss (1) that part of the dictum in Whalen v.
Milholland, supra n. 31, that made an effort to reconcile Murray v. Can-
non, supra n. 23, and (2) the case of Jones v. Crisp, supra n. 40, that
seized upon that dictum as authority.
" 163 Md. 1. 18.
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tion of which the fund cannot be withdrawn. As to the
former, our Court of Appeals has uniformly held that where
money is originally owned by one person and deposited in
a savings account subject to the order of two or more per-
sons (including the original owner but not in trust form),
and the depositor does not give away the pass book with
the intention of giving away the fund in the bank, there is
no perfected gift and thus no right of survivorship in the
alleged donee upon the donor's death. The reason for that
is obvious. The owner of money can by his own act vol-
untarily part with his ownership of it only by gift, payment
or bequest. Such a deposit as has just been named is obvi-
ously neither a bequest nor payment, for it possesses none
of the characteristics of either. It cannot be a gift to the
other person mentioned in the bank book because if the de-
positor retains the book, and the account is subject to his
order, he retains complete dominion over the fund. There
can be no perfected gift where the supposed donor reserves
a locus poenitentiae, and a locus poenitentiae is always re-
served when the alleged donor may at any moment withdraw
the fund from the bank.2
As to the second problem, the gift of the bank book, the
law governing it has developed in a very definite pattern,
clearly showing the trend of the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land to a more liberal construction of the old harsh rules of
delivery as relating to choses in action. The first Maryland
case56 definitely decided that a gift of the bank book was
not a gift of the funds in the bank. Later cases attempted
to reconcile the first case by looking at the wording of the
account and thereby holding valid a gift to the co-owner."
With but few retrogressions,5 the progress of the Court
was definitely marked and the next step was to validate a
gift of a bank account where the owner, in writing, indi-
cated his desire to transfer the account and then did every-
thing within his power to do so, except to manually transfer
" Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 48 A. 1060 (1901); subject to the
exception of Gardner v. Merritt, 32 Md. 78 (1870), supra n. 21.
11 Murray v. Cannon, 41 Md. 466 (1874).
57 Dictum in Whalen v. Milholland, 8upra circa n. 31.
8 Jones v. Crisp, 109 Md. 30, 79 A. 515 (1908), supra circa n. 40.
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the funds. 9 Finally, Brooks v. Mitchell clarified the law
and relegated the previous cases to oblivion by allowing the
owner of a bank account to transfer it by delivering the
bank book to a third party when proof of this was accom-
panied by sufficient evidence of the intention to make a
gift.60
While Maryland thus was pointed toward accord with
the modern law of gifts, the problem of accomplishing con-
trol during life plus informal transfer at death to a desired
survivor was not completely solved by the gift device. It is
possible, of course, for the property to go to the desired
survivor by gift of the bank book. But, to take advantage
of this the fortuitous moment to relinquish control must
be selected; and also, the risk must be run of the Court's
construction on the intention to make the gift.
TENANCY By ENTI=TY
During the course of events set out above survivorship
without single control during life had been accomplished
by creating tenancies by the entirety. An estate by entirety
is defined as an estate held by husband and wife by virtue
of title acquired by them jointly after marriage." It exists
mainly with regard to real property. While there is a
division of opinion about it,62 Maryland very definitely takes
the stand that a tenancy by the entirety may be created in
personalty."
59 Frentz v. Schwarze, 122 Md. 12, 89 A. 439 (1913) supra circa n. 45.
60 It may be possible, however, to argue that Brooks v. Mitchell is only
determinative of the right of a sole owner of a savings account to give
away the account by a gift of the bank book; and where the account is
in the name of two persons as "joint owners", the original owner of the
fund can only give that fund, by way of a gift of the bank book, to the
co-owner, because if given to someone other than the joint owner, the
inconsistency between the gift and the wording of the account would pre-
vent the attempted gift from being effectuated. It is submitted, however,
that such an argument should not be sustained because of the reasons
stated by the author In the text and because of the fact that where a
sole owner gives away his bank book with the intention of giving away
the funds In the bank there is just as much an inconsistency between
the claim of the donee and the wording of the account as exists when one
of two joint owners gives away the bank book to someone other than
the co-owner.
61Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 606, 66 A. 81 (1907); 30 C. J. 564, 565,
"Husband and Wife", Sec. 97.
::30 C. J. 574, 575, "Husband and Wife", Sec. 107.
00 Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 572, 48 A. 1060 (1901).
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The most important incidents of this tenancy are that
(1) property held by husband and wife as tenants by the
entireties cannot be taken to satisfy the several and separate
debts of either tenant64 and (2) the survivor of the mar-
riage, whether the husband or the wife, is entitled to the
whole and that this right cannot be defeated by a convey-
ance by the other to a stranger, as in the case of a joint
tenancy. 5
Thus, in Brewer v. Bowersox66 it was held that where a
certificate of deposit stated that a bank "has this day re-
ceived of Jacob or Emily Bowersox $1,981.72 which sum,
with the interest thereon at three per cent per annum will
be paid to them or their order at sixty days notice" a ten-
ancy by the entirety was created and on the death of the
husband the money went to the wife. The depositors were
disjunctively named in the certificate but the money was ex-
pressly made payable only to the two or the order of the
two, and these two persons were in fact husband and wife.
The creation of a tenancy by entireties does not depend on
the words employed in making a conveyance or a gift to
husband and wife; but it is because a conveyance or gift is
made to two persons who are husband and wife, and since
in the contemplation of the common law they are but one
person, they take and can only take, not by moieties, but
the entirety. 7
Thus, through the medium of the tenancy by entirety, a
right of survivorship can be created in a surviving spouse;
and this right of survivorship cannot be destroyed except
by the joint act of the two.68 However, even though sur-
vivorship is incidental to that type of tenancy, still it has
its limitations and disadvantages. It can only exist between
04 Annapolis Banking and Trust Co. v. Neilson, 164 Md. 8, 164 A. 157
(1932).
Tiffany, Real Property (1920) Sec. 165.
92 Md. 567, 48 A. 1060 (1901). The husband deposited money In a
bank in another state in the names of himself and wife, subject to the
order of either. His wife received from him the certificate for this sum.
and she afterwards caused the same to be collected by a bank in Mary-
land, upon her own indorsement alone, and deposited the amount in the
bank which issued therefor a certificate. The wife kept possession of
that certificate until after her husband's death, when the fund was claimed
by his administrator.
07 Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 48 A. 1060 (1901).
A8 Ibid; Baker v. Baker, 123 Md. 32, 90 A. 776 (1914).
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husband and wife. Also it would seem to be necessary for
the savings account to be subject to their joint order. Even
if consent in advance is obtained for the account to be sub-
ject to the order of only one, or of either one; still, it is
submitted, such a practice would prevent the existence of
the tenancy, as it would violate the underlying theory of the
unity of person of the husband and wife. 9 Such a practice
would seem to imply that that unity did not exist and that
each spouse was not seized of the whole or the entirety,
but only of a moiety.7 ° There is but one estate and, in con-
templation of law, it is held by but one person. Where the
consent of the other spouse is not obtained, it is clear that
no part of the estate can be disposed of so as to affect the
right of the non-consenting spouse.
Thus, the advantage of survivorship, through the device
of a tenancy by the entirety, is obtainable only at the ex-
pense of having a joint control of the account during life.
TRusTs
Until 1899 no one method had been devised by which the
owner of a savings bank deposit could retain control of it
during his life and still provide automatic disposition of
it through survivorship at death. The number of cases
that arose prior to that date signified the great need for
an answer. The solution was found through the use of
the trust.
In Milholland v. Whalen," Elizabeth O'Neill had opened
a savings account in the Metropolitan Savings Bank with
the following entry: "Metropolitan Savings Bank, in ac-
count with Miss Elizabeth 0'Neill. In trust for herself and
19 In Brewer v. Bowersox, supra n. 67, much importance is attached to
the fact that the certificate was worded so as to require the joint order
of husband and wife before the money could be drawn. Also, in Baker
v. Baker, supra n. 68, the fund was subject to the joint order of hus-
band and wife.
70 Massachusetts, in Milan v. Boucher, et al., 285 Mass. 590, 189 N. E.
576 (1934), and Michigan, in In re Farmers' and Merchants' Bank of
Grand Rapids, 221 Mich. 243, 190 N. W. 698 (1922) decided that where
deposits may be withdrawn by either the husband or the wife such a
state of facts is not consistent with a tenancy by the entirety. Just the
opposite has been decided by Pennsylvania, in Geist. et al. v. Robinson,
1 AtI. (2d) 153 (Pa. 1938); and Arkansas, in Dickson et al. v. Jones-
boro Trust Co., 154 Ark. 155, 242 S. W. 57 (1922).
7189 Md. 212, 43 A. 43 (1899).
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Mrs. Mary Whalen, widow, joint owners, subject to the order
of either; the balance at the death of either to belong to
the survivor." The bank book was retained by Miss O'Neill
and she drew out various sums during her life. After her
death the bank filed a bill of interpleader when both Miss
O'Neill's executor and Mrs. Whalen claimed the funds. A
judgment was rendered in favor of Mrs. Whalen.
This was the first time the Maryland Court of Appeals
was ever faced with a trust of a savings bank deposit. The
Court, after a review of what it considered the applicable
trust principles, found no objection to the vesting of the
money in the survivor.
Thus the way was opened and the path made clear to
accomplish that which had never been done before.7 The
owner of money was allowed to set up one device by which
he controlled the fund during his lifetime," and yet at his
death it belonged to the co-owner without any formality
whatsoever.
Certain rules for handling the device have appeared in
the cases. The entry itself, unexplained, is probably a suf-
ficient declaration of trust if it indicates an intention to
establish a trust.7" This, however, may be rebutted.7"  It
is not necessary that the cestui que trust should be noti-
fied of the declaration or establishment of the trust.76 It
is not necessary that the money be a new deposit; the form
of an old account may be changed without withdrawal and
redeposit. 7 Possession by the depositor of the bank book
72 The only previous Maryland case which discussed trusts in relation
to joint bank accounts was Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550 (1878), where the
Court dismissed the contention that a trust existed by finding that the
evidence did not sustain it.
78 Just so long as the owner controls the bank book, he controls the
fund even though the account is subject to the order of either party, infra
circa n. 131.
7, Infra circa notes 86-77.
76 Ibid.
76 Smith and Barber v. Darby, 39 Md. 268 (1874) ; Milbolland v. Whalen,
89 Md. 212, 43 A. 43 (1899).
77 Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank, 152 Md. 654, 137 A. 378 (1927).
Sturgis deposited money in a savings account in the following form:
"J. T. M. Sturgis and M. B. Foulke, in trust for both, subject to the
order of J. T. M. Sturgis, the balance at the death of either to go to
the survivor." This was later changed so as to be subject to the order
of either. This change was made only by an entry on the bank ledger.
On the death of Sturgis, his wife attempted to annul the trust but was
unsuccessful.
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in no way detracts from the force of the entry; because
it is a possession by the trustee and does not denote that
no beneficial interest had been given to the cestui que trust.78
Also, the trust is not rendered void by the appointment of a
beneficiary as trustee.79 The validity of the trust does not
depend upon any certainty of a balance remaining at the
death of the settlor5 0 The settlor may have a right to re-
voke, and his right of revocation exists in his right to with-
draw the money and thus entirely wipe out the account."1
The form of the entry may be varied from that used in
Milholland v. Whalen so that the account may be made
subject to the order of only one person, 2 or subject to a
71 Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512 (1873) ; Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md.
212, 43 A. 43 (1899).
9 Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 A. 43 (1899).
See Seiling v. Selling, 151 Md. 536, 548, 135 A. 376 (1926) ; Schaefer
v. Spear, 148 Md. 620, 129 A. 898 (1925). In the latter case an account
was opened in the name of Hattie B. Burton "in trust for herself and
Louis Schaefer, joint owners, subject to the order of either, the balance
at the death of either to belong to the survivor." Mrs. Burton withdrew
the whole fund during her lifetime. At her death, it was claimed by her
executor and the joint owner, so the bank filed a bill of interpleader.
It was held that by the terms of the trust it was only the balance in the
account at the death of either to which the survivor was to be entitled.
There was in fact no balance in the account when Mrs. Burton died be-
cause, as permitted by the terms of the deposit, she withdrew the whole
fund during her lifetime.
81 Ghingher v. Fanseen, 166 Md. 519, 172 A. 75 (1934) ; Hopkins Place
Savings Bank v. Holzer, - Md. -, 2 Atl. (2nd) 639 (1938); see Re-
statement, Trusts (1935) Vol. 1, Sec. 330, and comments thereto; Schaefer
v. Spear, 148 Md. 620, 129 A. 898 (1925). Restatement, Trusts (1935)
Vol. 1, Sec. 58, Comment b provides for the revocation of a savings bank
trust by other methods than the withdrawal of money, such as a disposi-
tion by will of the depositor in favor of someone other than the beneficiary.
It is uncertain whether the Court of Appeals of Maryland would recognize
such a revocation. A revocation could have been but was not recognized
in Hopkins Place Savings Bank v. Holzer. See discussion infra circa n.
115. The pledge of the bank book by the husband, under the Restatement
rule, might easily have been regarded as a revocation of the trust by the
depositor husband. Cf. In re Murray's Estate, 143 Misc. 499, 256 N. Y.
Supp. 816 (Sur. Ct. 1932); Matter of Siegelbaum, N. Y. L. J. March 1,
1933, at 1226 (Sur. Ct.).
82a. Littig v. Mt. Calvary Church, 101 Md. 494, 61 A. 635 (1905).
Mrs. Littig opened an account with the bank which read, "Mount Cal-
vary Protestant Episcopal Church, subject to the order of Kate Littig,
trustee, $500." At the death of Mrs. Littig, the fund was ordered to be
held by her executors, subject to the trust.
b. Stone v. National City Bank of Baltimore, 126 Md. 231, 94 A. 657
(1915). Mrs. S. Hunter deposited money in a savings account in the fol-
lowing form: "The National City Bank of Baltimore. In account with
Sarah Hunter, or Sara Heineman, in trust for both, joint owners, subject
to the order of Sarah Hunter, the balance at the death of either to go to
the survivor." Mrs. Hunter died and it was decided that a valid trust
was created with a right of revocation reserved, and the money belonged
to Sara Heineman at the death of Mrs. Hunter.
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joint order," or possibly in any form to suit the convenience
of the parties that does not violate a rule of law. Thus
Milholland v. Whalen became the foundation for a rapid
development of our modern law of joint bank accounts in
trust form. 4
c. Bollack v. Bollack, 169 Md. 407, 182 A. 317 (1935). A savings ac-
count read "Peter Bollack in trust for himself and Eva M. Bollack, joint
owners, subject to the order of Peter Bollack, balance at the death of
either to belong to the survivor." A valid revocable trust was created.
83 Gimbel v. Gimbel, 148 Md. 182, 128 A. 891 (1925). Mary Gimbel had
three separate savings accounts in the joint names of herself and each of
three children. Except for the change in the name of each child, these
deposits read, "In trust for Mary Gimbel and Frederick Gimbel, joint
owners, subject to the order of both only, the balance at the death of
either to belong to the survivor." It was found that there was no inten-
tion to create a trust so none was held to exist.
81 Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 A. 43 (1899), supra circa n. 71;
Littig v. Mt. Calvary Church, 101 Md. 494, 61 A. 635 (1905), supra n. 82;
Mulfinger v. Mulfinger, 114 Md. 463, 79 A. 1089 (1911). In the last
case, Eva Mulfinger had each of her two individual deposits transferred
to her credit, "in trust for herself and Maggie M. Mulfinger" (grand-
daughter) "Joint owners subject to the order of either, the balance at the
death of either to belong to the survivor." Later the granddaughter drew
out the entire balance of one account and half of the other for her own
benefit. The grandmother sued, but judgment was rendered for defendant.
The Court decided that a valid trust had been created and the rights of
the beneficiary were fixed.
In Colmary v. Fanning, 124 Md. 548, 92 A. 1045 (1915), Mrs. Colmary
opened a savings account which read, "Mrs. Sadie McS. Colmary, in trust
for herself and A. H. Colmary, joint owners, subject to the order of
either, the balance at the death of either to belong to the survivor. The
evidence showed that no trust was ever intended so none was held to
exist. In Coburn v. Shilling, 138 Md. 177, 113 A. 761 (1921), a savings
account was opened in the name of, "J. Dunn, in trust for himself and
C. Coburn, joint owners, subject to the order of either, the balance at
the death of either to belong to the survivor." It was decided that the
presumption in favor of the validity of the trust was not rebutted and
the money belonged to C. Coburn on the death of J. Dunn.
In Reil v. Wempe, 145 Md. 448, 125 A. 738 (1924), Wempe had his
personal account in the name of "Margaret Reil in trust for herself and
George H. Wempe, subject to the order of either, the balance at the death
of either to belong to the survivor." It was decided that "a complete
and irrevocable trust was established and on the death of Wempe the
money went to Margaret Reil." It is submitted that the term "irrevoca-
ble" is not used here in its usual sense as the account was subject to
the order of either. Thus, Wempe could have withdrawn the money at
any time before his death and the trust would have then been revoked.
See Gimbel v. Gimbel, 148 Md. 182, 128 A. 891 (1925) supra n. 83; Sturgis
v. Citizens National Bank, 152 Md. 654, 137 A. 378 (1927) supra n. 77;
Foschia v. Foschia, 158 Md. 69, 148 A. 121 (1929). In the last named case
a savings account was opened in the name of "John Foschia, in trust for
self and Domenico Foschia, joint owners, subject to the order of either,
the balance at the death of either to belong to the survivor." The pre-
sumption in favor of the trust was rebutted when it was proved that
no trust was intended and the co-beneficiary named on the bank book
did not get the fund.
In McDevitt v. Sponseller, 160 Md. 497, 154 A. 140 (1931), a savings
account read "James B. Sponseller, in trust for himself and Lucy E. Spon-
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The important factor to be considered in the establish-
ment of these accounts is the intention of the settlor. It
is his act which originates the trust and it is the intention
with which he does the act that is material . 5  This inten-
tion may be manifested in many ways, one of which is
the wording of the account itself. There are two classi-
fications of accounts; first, the situation where the words
"trust" or "trustee" are used; and second, where there
is no mention of those magic symbols. What is the result
of their presence or absence? Professor Bogert states"6
that it might be assumed that the deposit of money in a
bank with the use of the word "trust" would lead to the
establishment of a trust. However, he continues to point
out that because the trust deposit form is so often used for
purposes other than the creation of a trust, 7 the majority
of courts hold that the claimant must show by other facts
than the mere deposit that his object was the creation of
a true trust-"
seller, joint owners subject to the check of either, balance at the death
of either to belong to the survivor." The trust was sustained and at the
death of James B. Sponseller the money passed to Lucy E. Sponseller.
See also Bollack v. Bollack, 169 Md. 407, 182 A. 317 (1935) supra n. 82;
and Dougherty v. Dougherty, - Md. -, 2 Atl. (2d) 433 (1938), where
a savings account was in the name of one McHugh as trustee for himself
and F. P. Dougherty ... "balance at death of either to belong to the
survivor." Formerly the named survivor had been Leo Dougherty and
after McHugh's death Francis voluntarily changed the account to him-
self as trustee for himself and his brother, Leo; but, subsequently sub-
stituted his wife as survivor. Bill of complaint was filed alleging that
the funds were intended by the grantor to be for the benefit of the P.
Dougherty Co., a body corporate. This bill of complaint was dismissed
because the evidence was not sufficient to indicate that the settlor in-
tended any trust for the benefit of the corporation. And see Mathias v.
Fowler, 124 Md. 655, 93 A. 298 (1915), where the account read, "The
Union National Bank of Westminster in account with W. R. Fowler or
Win. A. Mathias or either of them." It was argued that a trust was in-
tended. However, it was decided that the evidence failed to show any
intent to transfer a present interest so no trust existed. See infra n. 129.
s5 This is implicit in the series of cases, supra n. 84.
8 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) See. 47.
67 Taxation, rules of the bank limiting the amount which any one in-
dividual may keep on deposit, the desire to obtain high rates of interest
where there Is a discrimination based on the amount of deposits, and
the desire to veil or conceal from others knowledge of their pecuniary
condition would be among the reasons for using it for other purposes.
88 This statement seems to imply that the mere use of the word "trust"
is not sufficient of itself to create a trust. However, in all the cases
which Professor Bogert cites to support his statement, no decision was
found which was rendered on the wording of the account alone. There
was always evidence introduced to show an Intention not to create a
trust. See Bogert supra n. 86, 204, n. 12.
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In Maryland, the cases would seem to indicate that the
entry in the bank book containing words of trust raises the
presumption of a trust. Milhotland v. Whalen said, 9 "The
entry unexplained, is a sufficient declaration of trust, be-
cause it indicates an intention to establish a trust,90 but this
may be rebutted". Such a statement is self-explanatory.
In a case where no evidence is offered by either side other
than the introduction of the bank book with the usual form
of trust deposit, the claimant under such trust should not
have to show his position by any facts other than the mere
deposit. This would seem to result from the repetition of
the abbv -statement from Milholland v. Whalen in many
later cases. 1 Its latest pronouncement appeared in Dough-
erty v. Dougherty2 where the Court said:
"Where an account is entered to one in trust for
himself and another, as joint tenants, subject to the
order of either, balance if any at the death of either
to belong to the survivor, a presumption instantly arises
that upon the death of one of the tenants, the survivor
takes title to any balance remaining in the fund, and
the burden is upon any third person who alleges that
a different result was intended by the settlor to prove
that fact."
Only two Maryland cases could be construed as casting
doubt upon such a conclusion, Austin v. Central Savings
Bank,"3 and Pearre v. Grossnickle9 4 In the former case
I' 89 Md. 212, 216.
00 This would seem to be contrary to Professor Bogert's statement, but
in light of the facts of the cases used by Professor Bogert to support his
statement, it is submitted that Maryland is not contrary to the weight
of authority. In both jurisdictions the mention of the word "trust" is
merely presumptive evidence of the existence of a trust. Such an entry
is sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to the party claiming that
no trust exists.
1 Repeated in Littig v. Mt. Calvary Church, 101 Md. 494, 61 A. 635
(1905) supra n. 82; Mulfinger v. Mulfinger, 114 Md. 463, 79 A. 1089 (1911),
supra n. 84; Stone v. National City Mank of Baltimore, 126 Md. 231, 94
A. 657 (1915), supra n. 82; Farmer v. Farmer, 137 Md. 69, 111 A. 64
(1920) ; Coburn v. Shilling, 138 Md. 177, 113 A. 761 (1921), supra n. 84:
Reil v. Wempe, 145 Md. 448, 125 A. 738 (1924), supra n. 84. Gimbel v.
Gimbel, 148 Md. 182, 128 A. 891 (1925), supra n. 83; Foschia v. Foschia,
158 Md. 69, 148 A. 121 (1929), supra n. 84; McDevitt v. Sponseller, 160 Md.
497, 154 A. 140 (1931), supra n. 84: Bollack v. Bollack. 169 Md. 407, 182
A. 317 (1935), supra n. 82.
92- Md. -, 2 A. (2nd) 433, 435 (1938).
99 126 Md. 139, 94 A. 520 (1915).
94 139 Md. 274, 115 A. 49 (1931).
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the deposit was merely in the form of "E. D. Loane, trus-
tee" and it was stated that95 "the mere use of the word
'trustee' is not sufficient of itself to create a trust. If no
intent to create a trust appears, none will be held to exist
regardless of the use of the form of the words used".
However, in view of the fact that this type of entry is so
indefinite, it is submitted that the case is not contrary to
the previously stated Maryland rule but states a rule of
law in itself as applicable to an indefinite, vague declara-
tion of trust. In Pearre v. Grossnickle the donor ordered
the bank to change his personal account to a joint account.
No mention was made of a trust but the bank entered the
account in the trust form on its own initiative. It was
again stated that the mere use of certain magic words was
not sufficient of itself to create a trust. If no intent
appeared, none would be held to exist regardless of the
words used.
It should be observed that the proof in these two cases
embraced facts other than the clear entry of a trust on
the bank book. And it would seem that they represent the
type of situation to which Professor Bogert's rule, men-
tioned above, is appropriately applicable. If this is true,
in light of the other Maryland cases, it can be said that'
the rule of this State is that where the words "trust" or
"trustee" are used, with the knowledge of the settlor, in
a complete and clear declaration in the bank book, a pre-
sumption will exist that a valid trust was intended by the
settlor and the burden of going forward with the evidence
will be upon the party claiming no trust. Successful re-
buttal, however, has occurred in several cases.9 6
In cases where there were no words of trust present in
the phrasing of the account,97 although the trust theory
was argued, there have been no definite statements as to
" 126 Md. 139, 144; quoted from Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550 (1878).
96Colmary v. Fanning, 124 Md. 548, 92 A. 1045 (1915), supra n. 84;
Coburn v. Shilling, 138 Md. 177, 113 A. 761 (1921), 8upra n. 84; Gimbel
v. Gimbel, 148 Md. 182, 128 A. 891 (1925), supra n. 83; Foschla v. Foschia,
158 Md. 69, 148 A. 121 (1929), 8upra n. 84.
9 Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550 (1878) (Held: no valid trust), supra n.
84; Mathias v. Fowler, 124 Md. 655, 93 A. 298 (Held: no valid trust),
supra n. 84. Baker v. Baker, 123 Md. 32, 90 A. 776 (1914) (Valid trust
created).
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presumption and burden of proof. It seems logical to state,
however, that in view of the presumption existing with the
use of the words "trust" or "trustee"; where those wordsl
are not present, no presumption as to a trust will exist and
the burden of proof and of coming forward with the evi-
dence will rest on the party claiming a trust to show the
requisite intention of the donor. This intention may be'
gathered from express statements of intent, acts of the de-
positor other than express statements, and the circum-
stances of the deposit."
Once it has been ascertained, to the satisfaction of the
court, that the donor intended to establish a trust the next
step is to inquire into the form of the agreement to see if
any of the orthodox rules of trusts have been violated.
The greatest theoretical obstacle to such a trust of a,
savings bank deposit is its testamentary character. In
the creation of any trust, the owner of property may intend
to create a trust of the property either by transferring it
to another person as trustee or by declaring himself trustee
of it. In either event,: if the beneficiaries do not acquire
any interest in the property prior to his death, the trans-
action is clearly testamentary and invalid unless there is a
compliance with the requirements of the Statute of Wills.9
Although frequently difficult of application, the theoret-
ical distinction between a deed to a trustee and a transfer
by will to a trustee is easily stated. The deed has an im-
mediate operative effect to pass a present or future interest
in property either vested absolutely, vested subject to be-
ing divested, or contingent. The will has no immediate
operative effect. It passes a property interest only at the
death of the testator, if the will is left in effect until that,
date."' The question is, generally, not whether the grantor
intends to accomplish, by a conveyance inter vivos, similar
practical effects to those which a will would have produced,
but whether the theory and mode of operation of the instru-
ment is testamentary or otherwise. Conveyances which
operate inter vivos are not turned into wills because they
18 Bogert, supra n. 86, See. 47.
99 Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 521.
100 Bogert, supra n. 86, Sec. 1.0..
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effect a distribution of the grantor's property in anticipa-
tion of his death and relieve him from the trouble of making
a will.' There may, however, be such a retention of pow-
ers of management and control in the settlor, as well as of
enjoyment during his life, that the courts must look through
the inter vivos trust form in order to forestall evasion of
the policy of the Statute of Wills. Therefore it is necessary
to inquire into the general rules of construction used to
differentiate a trust from a will and to see how those rules
apply to a trust of a savings bank deposit, if at all.
It has been generally accepted that the settlor of a trust"
may reserve a beneficial life estate and also a power to re-
voke and modify the trust during his life and the trust will
not be construed to be testamentary. 1°' However, where
not only a beneficial life estate and a power to revoke and
modify the trust are reserved, but there is reserved also
a power to control the trustee as to the details of the ad-
ministration of the trust so that the trustee is the agent of
the settlor, the disposition, so far as it is intended to take
effect after his death, is testamentary and is invalid unless
the requirements of the statutes relating to the validity of
wills are complied with.' If the settlor should declare him-
self trustee and reserve not only a beneficial life estate and
a power to revoke and modify the trust, but also a power
to deal with the property as long as he lives, the intended
trust is testamentary and fails unless executed with the
formality of a will. 04
When that limitation is applied to the usual trust of a
savings bank deposit it is easily seen that the deposit is
testamentary in character in the great majority of cases.
Let us examine the usual entry which appears, "X Bank,'
in account with A. In trust for A and B, joint owners, sub-
ject to the order of either; the balance at the death of either
to belong to the survivor." Here A is the settlor and as
101 Ibid.
102 Restatement, Trusts (1935), vol. 1, See. 57 (1) ; Jones v. Old Colony
Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1925) ; Bogert, supra n. 86, See.
103.
10 Restatement, Trusts (1935) Vol. 1. See. 57 (2) ; Bogert, supra n. 86,
Ch. 6; McEvoy v. Five Cent Savings Bank, 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. E. 465
(1909) ; Scott, supra n. 99, 529, n. 27 ff.
10. Restatement, Trusts (1935) Vol. 1, Sec. 57 (3).
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such he reserves to himself all the attributes of complete
ownership. He can enjoy the income from the corpus dur-
ing his life, or he may use up the corpus completely. He
can withdraw it from the bank, invest it, sell the investment
and redeposit the proceeds. Yet, on his death, it will go to
his selected beneficiary without formality. In essence, he
has complete dominion over the fund in that he may re-
voke, modify, manage, and control.
Because of this accomplishment of complete control
during life and passage to a desired beneficiary on his
death, the "tentative" trust (as labeled by the Restatement)
was condemned in some cases as violative of the Statute
of Wills. °5 It may be sustained, despite its obvious viola-
tion of the policy of the Statute of Wills either upon the
technical basis that in form at least, all interests passed
inter vivos,1°6 or upon a frank recognition that an exception
to the normal rule was being engrafted to satisfy the de-
mands of social policy."'7
It is generally accepted that a similar trust of property
other than a savings bank deposit would be invalid. °8 There-
fore, these savings bank trusts should be regarded in no
other light than as an exception to the usual rule regarding
testamentary trusts. Such was the position of the Restate-
ment of Trusts, but only after considerable reflection."'
The exception, however, is based on sound social policy
in order to allow control of small sums of money during
life and yet to facilitate the testamentary disposition of
them without requiring the formalities of the Statute of
Wills and the attendant expense of probate. The chances
for fraudulent and inequitable results are almost negligible
because the recording of the transaction on the books of
the bank provides easy methods of identification.
105 Springvale National Bank v. Ward, 122 Me. 227, 119 A. 529 (1923);
Coolidge v. Knight, 194 Mass. 546, 80 N. E. 620 (1907); Bartlett v. Rem-
ington, 59 N. H. 364; Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N. J. Eq. 743, aff'd. 71 N. J.
Eq. 777, 61 A. 267 (1905). See Restatement of Trusts, Tentative Draft
No. 1, Explanatory Notes to Sec. 65 (1930).
106 This seems to be the position of the Maryland cases.
107 Restatement, Trusts (1935) Vol. 1, Sec. 58; Scott, supra n. 99, 543.
108 Bogert supra n. 86, Secs. 47, 103; Scott, 8upra n. 99, 529, 543.
109 Restatement, Trusts (1935) Vol. 1, Sec. 57 (3). See Tentative Draft
No. 1, See. 65 and explanatory note thereto.
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The objection to the trust of a savings bank deposit,
because of its effect as a will, has never been fully con-
sidered by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The Court
has never sought to differentiate it from any other type
of trust and has seemingly regarded it as unobjectionable
from the point of view of its being testamentary, upon the
technical statement that an inter vivos trust is validly cre-
ated. At this late date, the binding precedent of forty
years recognition is not likely to be overcome; and the "ten-
tative" trust, no matter how justified, has taken its place
in Maryland as an appropriate aid to the man of moderate
means in handling his savings bank accounts. An appre-
ciation of its unusual character, however, might have helped
the Court in handling the collateral problems next consid-
ered, and might yet be of value in the treatment of such
problems in the future.
COLLATERAL PROBLEMS
Rights of Creditors
Within the past year two cases have been decided on the
rights of third persons to reach the corpus of a "trust"
savings bank deposit in order to satisfy the debt of one
of the co-owners. The first was Fairfax v. Savings Bank of
Baltimore"° where Mary Fairfax, plaintiff, was injured and
recovered a judgment of $5,000 against Howard E. Brazier.
The latter had a savings account in the Savings Bank of
Baltimore in the form of "Howard E. Brazier, in trust for
self and Nellie M. Brazier, joint owners, subject to the order
of either, balance at death of either to belong to the sur-
vivor." An attachment was issued on the judgment and
laid in the hands of the bank as garnishee. A second at-
tachment was laid in the hands of Howard E. Brazier as
trustee, garnishee. Both attachments were held to be in-
effective.
The basis of the decision may be briefly summarized as
being threefold: first, the interest of the debtor was un-
certain and contingent on survivorship and therefore not
10 Md. -, 199 A. 872 (1938).
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within the scope of the Code section;"' second, both hus-
band and wife had contributed to the corpus of the trust..2
and therefore it is not within the "tentative" trust doc-
trine of the Restatement of Trusts ;113 and, third, the right
of withdrawal existed in both beneficiaries and whether it
shall be exercised depends wholly upon the individual will
of each severally motivated. A creditor of one cannot make
this election, nor compel the debtor to act, because to do
so would destroy the right of survivorship that existed in
the co-beneficiary as well as the latter's right to withdraw
the entire amount in the absence of the debtor's doing so
first.
The first and third reasons of the Court are the result
of the application of formal trust rules to a device that is
by nature informal. They are applicable only because the
Court failed to recognize that it was dealing with a situa-
tion that is different from the ordinary trust.
Ostensibly these two bases for the decision are in con-
flict with the Restatement of Trusts.114 The latter, how-
ever, is somewhat uncertain in phraseology and the Court
distinguished it from the instant case by means of the sec-
"" "Any kind of property or credits belonging to the defendant, in the
plaintiff's own hands, or in the hands of any one else, may be attached;
and credits may be attached which shall not then be due." Md. Code,
Art. 9, Sec. 10.
112 The husband and wife had both contributed from their own per-
sonal fortunes to buy real estate as tenants by the entirety and the
present trust fund represented the proceeds of a loan upon that real
estate.
ILI Restatement, Trusts (1935) Vol. 1, see. 58: "Where a person makes
a deposit in a savings account in a bank in his own name as trustee for
another person intending to reserve a power to withdraw the whole or
any part of the deposit at any time during his lifetime and to use as his
own whatever he may withdraw, or otherwise to revoke the trust, the
intended trust is enforceable by the beneficiary upon the death of the
depositor as to any part remaining on deposit on his death, if he has not
revoked his trust." Restatement, Trusts (1935) Vol. 1, See. 58, Comment
a: ". . . Such a trust is called a 'tentative' trust;" Restatement, Trusts
(1935) Vol. 1, Sec. 58, Comment c: "Although creditors of the settlor
cannot reach the trust property merely because he has reserved a power
of revocation, creditors of a person who makes a savings deposit upon
a tentative trust can reach his interest, since he has such extensive powers
over the deposit as to justify treating him as in substance the unrestricted
owner of the deposit. So also, on the death of the depositor if the de-
posit is needed for the payment of his debts, his creditors can reach it.
So also, if it is needed it can be applied to the payment of his funeral
expenses and the expenses of the administration of his estate, if he has
not sufficient other property which can be applied for these purposes."
114 Ibid.
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ond reason. Thus the way was left open for the application
of the Restatement rule, at least when the debtor originally
owned the funds.
The other case dealing with the rights of third persons
to reach a trust of a savings bank deposit to satisfy a debt
of one of the co-owners is Hopkins Place Savings Bank v.
Holzer,115 where a husband and wife had a savings account
which read "John H. Holzer, in trust for himself and Eliza-
beth H. Holzer, joint tenants, subject to the order of either,
the balance at the death of either to belong to the survivor."
The husband withdrew money from this account without the
knowledge of his wife but later deposited a sum equal to
that which was withdrawn. In order to raise funds for this
re-deposit the husband borrowed the money from the bank
in which the money was deposited and as security gave the
bank physical possession of the pass book without the knowl-
edge of his wife. He signed no withdrawal slip or order.
After the husband died the wife attempted to withdraw the
money and on refusal of the bank to make payment, she
brought suit and judgment was rendered in her favor.
The decision was based mainly on the knowledge of the
bank as to the terms of the deposit and the rule that one
joint owner cannot pledge the interest of his other joint
owner as security for a debt without the consent of that
other joint tenant.
Though this case may be distinguished from the Fairfax
case on its facts, yet the same essential principles are in-
volved in that both cases deal with the rights of third
parties to satisfy a debt of one beneficiary out of the corpus
of a joint trust account. Where the Fairfax case left the
way open for applying the Restatement rules under proper
factual conditions, as to a creditor claiming prior to the
death of his debtor, the Holzer case seems to block a cred-
itor claiming subsequent to death as allowed by Sec. 58c.
Under that section, "creditors of a person who makes a
savings deposit upon a tentative trust can reach his inter-
est * * on the death of the depositor if the deposit is
115 Md. -, 2 Atl. (2d) 639 (1938). Cf. Matter of Siegelbaum,
N. Y. L. J. March 1, 1933, at 1226 (Sur. Ct.) ; Beake's Dairy Co. v. Berns,
128 App. Div. 137, 112 N. Y. Supp. 529 (1908) supra n. 81.
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needed for the payment of his debts." The loan of $4,100
was made to the husband, was immediately deposited into
the trust account, and remained there until his death.
Although the Court made no reference to the Restate-
ment in this case, its refusal to allow the bank's claim would
seem to be contrary to the above stated principle of 58c,
unless there can be said to be a distinction between the bank,
as creditor, and all other creditors, or unless the case rests
upon the way in which it arose (i. e., the bank had not at-
tached, but was resting on a lien based on a pledge of the
bank book)."' It might be observed that the Court made
no effort to use its second reason from the Fairfax case and
ascertain the source of the fund. To do so would have in-
dicated that the fund belonged to the husband debtor and
would have provided no distinction from the Restatement
rule.
Thus we are left in doubt whether the Maryland Court
is definitely repudiating Section 58c of the Restatement
as to the rights of creditors in "tentative" trusts of sav-
ings accounts, or whether it is setting up the above two
cases as special situations. In any event, in both of these
cases, and in the set-off cases" 7 the court has refused to
deviate from the results called for by the technical trust
rules.
It is submitted that orthodox rules should not be applied
to situations that are unorthodox per se. Courts should not
lose sight of the hybrid origin of the savings bank trust.
The "tentative" trust of a savings account was held valid
to allow the owner of money to control it during his life-
time and then pass it on to a designated beneficiary at his
death, although to do so violates the policy of the Statute
of Wills.1 8 Essentially a testamentary disposition is al-
lowed to operate as an inter vivos trust to effect a definite
social policy-to facilitate the handling of sums of money
on deposit in a savings bank that could be handled so ex-
peditiously in no other way. A trust of a savings deposit
""And cf. supra n. 81.
" Supra circa notes 119-125.
18 Supra circa notes 99-109.
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was never intended to be used as a device to defraud cred-
itors.
Rules of law should be formulated to cope with this un-
orthodox form of trust in order to further the interests of
society. This should not necessarily be done by comparing
it to the analogous orthodox situation. Hence if a beneficial
social result in a future case calls for piercing the trust
shield in a given case, it is to be hoped the courts will accept
the door which the Restatement seems to leave open.
Set-Off.
Occasionally banks cease operation holding both a de-
posit and a debt due the bank by the depositor. A sole
owner of a savings account has been allowed to set off his
deposit against his promissory note held by the bank after
the latter became insolvent." 9 This, however, does not pre-
sent the same situation as is presented when the deposit is
in some type of joint account. How this problem of set-off
was to be handled when applied to the "tentative" trust of
a bank account, or to any joint account was first presented
to the Court in Ghingher v. Fanseen."12  There the depositor
tried to set off a claim against an insolvent bank in the form
of a deposit made by him in his own name "in trust for"
himself and wife, as "joint owners, subject to the order of
either, the balance at the death of either to belong to the
survivor," against the bank's claim against him individu-
ally. The set-off was not allowed. The question presented
was whether or not the two claims possessed that quality of
mutuality essential to give the depositor the right to have
his interest in the fund set off against his debt to the bank.
The depositor had a dual interest in the account. He
was a trustee and also a cestui que trust, who, if he survived
the other beneficiary, would become entitled to so much of
the fund as remained in the deposit at that time, and who
could withdraw any part or all of said fund upon his own
individual order or demand. His interest as trustee could
'll Colton v. Drover's Building Assoc., 90 Md. 85, 45 A. 23 (1899).120 166 Md. 519, 172 A. 75 (1934). The case is also of interest because
it holds in effect that a suit for recovery of a trust deposit could not be
maintained by one of the co-beneficiaries Individually. See Union Trust
Co. v. Mullineaux, 173 Md. 124, 131, 132, 194 A. 823 (1937).
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not be set off against his personal indebtedness because the
demands were not mutual and in the same right. A claim
held in a representative capacity cannot be set off against a
personal debt of a representative such as a trustee or an
executor. 2' To hold otherwise would allow the trustee to
pay his own debts with trust property.
The interest of the depositor in the account as a cestui
que trust could not be set off against his personal indebted-
ness because the fund remained subject to the terms of the
trust upon which the deposit was made. The terms of that
deposit created a valid, revocable or "tentative" trust.'22
As such, either beneficiary had the right to withdraw the
money at any time, but until it was withdrawn it remained
subject to the terms of the trust. The mere power to with-
draw the fund was not accepted as equivalent to an actual
withdrawal thereof. Therefore, until the fund was with-
drawn the claimant merely had an interest which was likely
to be wiped out at any time by the withdrawal of the fund
by the co-owner.
The right of the bank to claim a set-off was presented to
the Court in People's Bank of Denton v. Turner.'28 Having
a sum of money on deposit in its savings department in the
names of "Annie E. Turner or Florence E. Thompson, or
survivor," the bank claimed a right to set-off against its
liability on the deposit a note of Mrs. Thompson's in a
larger amount. Miss Turner attempted to withdraw the
whole amount and the bank refused, claiming its right of
set-off. A suit for the full amount of the deposit resulted in
11 Cohen v. Karp, 143 Md. 208, 211, 122 A. 524 (1923) : Brown v. Stewart,
1 Md. Ch. 88 (1847). An interesting trust illustration is Hagerstown
Bank & Trust Co. v. College of St. James, 167 Md. 646, 176 A. 276 (1935)
where depositor could not set off against his deposit a mortgage debt which
it owed to bank as trustee.
122 Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 A. 43 (1899). Supra circa
n. 84. In Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 125, 71 N. E. 748, 752 (1904) the
New York theory of "tentative" trusts is expounded as follows: "A de-
posit by one person of his own money in his own name as trustee for
another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during
the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable
at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by
some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or
notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary
without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance,
the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the bal-
ance on hand at the death of the depositor."
1-8 169 Md. 430, 182 A. 314 (1936).
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Miss Turner's favor and the bank was denied its right of
set-off.
This was based on the fact that, "separation, for ascer-
tainment of a right of set-off which the bank might have
against either one, could be worked out only by external
evidence," and that "evidence seemed to indicate that Miss
Turner was the sole owner" .124
Though the trustee beneficiary may not be entitled to set
off the trust deposit against his individual debt, yet when
the trustee beneficiary actually allows the set-off and the co-
beneficiary apparently acquiesces over a lengthy period of
time, the latter cannot dispute the set-off after such appar-
ent acquiescence. This was the doctrine decided in Union
Trust Co. v. Mullineaux.125  The deposit was: "In ac-
count with Ervin Mullineaux, in trust for self and Lillie
Mullineaux, joint owners, subject to the order of either, the
balance at the death of either to belong to the survivor."
The bank set-off against the account the previously unpaid
note liabilities of the trustee beneficiary. It was held that
under the circumstances, this could not be disputed by the
co-beneficiary.
It is submitted that the results of Ghingher v. Fanseen
and Union Trust Co. v. Mullineaux are reached because of
the application of the technical rules of trust from which
the Court has seemingly refused to deviate. The problem
of set-off as applied to a joint trust account may be said to
be analogous to the rights of creditors to reach the same
type of deposit, in that the fundamental distinction between
the ordinary trust and the trust of a savings account is a
factor that should be taken into consideration in both in-
stances.
Liability of the Bank
The bank itself may find it necessary to decide whether
or not it will incur any liability by paying or not paying
funds in a savings account to a joint owner. In Metropoli-
tan Savings Bank v. Murphy,126 Michael Murphy deposited
money in a savings account first in his own name and later
12 169 Md. 430, 432.
12 173 Md. 124, 194 A. 823 (1937).
1882 Md. 314, 33 A. 640 (1896).
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in the names of himself and his wife, "subject to the order
of either, the balance at the death of either to belong to the
survivor." After opening this account, the husband made
no withdrawals therefrom and upon his death the bank
paid the deposit to the surviving wife. The administrator
of Michael Murphy claimed the money as belonging to the
estate, but it was decided that the money could not be re-
covered from the bank. This case, however, was not a
direct suit for the funds in the account; it involved the right
of the bank under the contract of deposit.""7 The Court
said,2 s "the only question which we are now called on to
decide is, had the bank authority in law to make such pay-
ment?" This question was answered in the affirmative.
The holding of this case was seemingly codified by the
passage of a statute'29 which relieves a bank from liability
after it has paid the funds in the account, or any part there-
of, to either of joint owners, whether the other is living or
not.
This statute was first construed in Metropolitan Savings
Bank v. Appler 80 where the bank paid the deposit to one of
two cestui que trustent even though that party did not pre-
sent the bank book. Upon suit by the other cestui que trust
the bank was held liable for the amount so paid out without
the production of the bank book in violation of the rules and
by-laws of the bank as printed on the pass book. The stat-
ute was construed to have no appplication where a provision
in the pass book requires its production when money is with-
drawn and such provision is disregarded. This provision
of the Code has also been interpreted as to have no bearing
on the question of whether or not a gift of the fund has been
perfected.181
127 This is the basis of distinction used in Gorman v. Gorman, 85 Md.
645, 37 A. 363 (1897) where the Court said, in referring to Metropolitan
Savings Bank v. Murphy: "Here there Is no question as to the right of
the bank under the contract of deposit, but the object is to ascertain who
is the legal and true owner of the fund. It may well be that as between
the depositor and the bank, perhaps the entry in the bank book might be
conclusive; and if the bank had paid the money according to the terms
of the entry, it might be protected; but as between the depositor or
her executor and the appellant the entry is not conclusive."
128 82 Md. 314, 320.
12 Md. Code, Art. 11, Sec. 76.
180 151 Md. 571, 135 A. 373 (1926).
181 Mathias v. Fowler, 124 Md. 655, 677. 93 A. 298 (1915) sinpra n. 84.
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Taxation
Prior to 1935 there was no inheritance tax on property
passing to the father, mother, husband, wife, children, or
lineal descendants of the deceased. In that year a tax of
one per cent was levied on property passing to the above
named persons. 132 Property was specifically taxed which
passed "to or for the use of, in trust or otherwise," persons
other than collateral heirs. In that same year the collateral
inheritance tax was raised from five to seven and one-half
per cent.18 At the Extraordinary Session of the Maryland
Legislature in 1936 the one per cent tax was retained on
property passing to persons other than collateral heirs184
and the seven and one-half per cent tax on property passing
to collaterals was also retained. 85 In 19378. it was enacted
that "any interest legal or equitable of any surviving spouse
• . .in any monies on deposit in the names of husband and
wife passing to such surviving spouse" shall not be subject
to an inheritance tax.
Opinions of the Attorney General state that money pass-
ing to one of two tenants by the entirety is exempt from this
one per cent tax.187 If, however, the money is in the name
of the husband, in trust for himself and his wife, a question
may arise as to the applicability of the tax on the death of
the husband. It is submitted, however, that the wording of
the statute"8 is sufficiently broad to exempt monies passing
to the survivor under such an account. 189 It is of interest
to note that the 1937 act40 specifically states that "in cases
of joint tenancy where the interests are not otherwise speci-
fied or fixed by law, the interest passing shall be determined
by dividing the value of the property by the number of joint
tenants' ,.11
"I Md. Code Supp., Art. 81, Sec. 104 A.
118 Md. Code Supp., Art. 81, Sec. 105.
184 Md. Acts, 1936, Ch. 124, See. 104A.
135 Md. Acts, 1936, Ch. 124, See. 105.
180 Md. Acts, 1937, Ch. 189, Sec. 105A.
18122 Ops. A. G. Md. 662 (1937). This would also be true in a joint
tenancy where the joint tenants are husband and wife.
108 Md. Acts, 1937, Ch. 189, Sec. 105A.
139 22 Ops. A. G. Md. 705, 749, 788 (1937).
1,0 Md. Acts, 1937, Ch. 189, See. 105A.
"I Md. Acts, 1937, Ch. 189, See. 105A. exempts legacies not exceeding
$100 from collateral and direct inheritance taxes.
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